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Abstract 
This study considers listed and unlisted small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) of the United 
States separately while developing one-year financial distress prediction model for them. Empirical 
analysis of financial distress performed using discrete-time duration-dependent hazard rate modelling 
technique with logit link and a set of financial covariates reveal striking differences between distress 
hazard of listed and unlisted SMEs. Almost an identical set of covariates exhibit significant 
discriminatory power for both listed and unlisted SMEs, but there exist significant differences in their 
weights of regression coefficients in respective groups. Further, Average Marginal Effects of 
respective covariates for unlisted group of SMEs are strikingly higher than their listed counterparts, 
suggesting higher vulnerability of unlisted firms due to changes in financial ratios. Our findings 
support the view that stock exchange listing can relieve SMEs from external financing constraints, 
thus reducing their likelihood of financial distress.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are widely considered to be a fundamental 
component of an economy, and are viewed as an important route to recovery in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Given the increased importance of SMEs, a 
significant volume of academic literature on SMEs financial distress has emerged in recent 
years (e.g. Altman and Sabato 2007, Gupta, Wilson, et al. 2014a, 2014b, Keasey et al. 2014). 
Among several reasons, access to external finance is unanimously the most important factor 
hindering SMEs growth, development (e.g. Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006, Ardic et al. 
2012) and potentially, survival. Lack of collateral and information asymmetries reduces their 
access to bank financing, while stock exchange listing could relieve them from financing 
constraints (Kim 1999). Thereby, they may relax their overdependence on lending 
institutions/banks for external financing by listing themselves in stock exchanges, 
consequently removing the financial barriers hindering their growth and competitiveness. 
However, listing might be difficult due to admission requirements and disclosure regulations 
(see Gao et al. 2013). This realization has led to the emergence of stock markets with relaxed 
admission requirements and disclosure regulations specifically targeting SMEs (e.g. 
Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange). Disclosures can reduce 
information asymmetry between firms and external financers/investors, which in turn can 
make access to external finance easier. As a consequence, listed SMEs are expected to 
experience lower financial distress hazard than their unlisted counterparts.    
We contribute to the literature on SMEs by examining if there are significant differences in 
the determination of financial distress of listed and unlisted SMEs. Our empirical question is 
motivated by the Information Cost Liquidity Hypothesis (ICLH) in the market microstructure 
literature. The ICLH was first established by Van Horne (1970) in the context of new listings 
on the New York Stock  Exchange,  stating  that  listing  signals  good  news  about  firms’  future  
prospects. Since the work by Horne (1970), researchers such as Shleifer (1986), Dhillon and 
Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner (1995), Hegde and McDermott (2003), Gregoriou and 
Ioannidis (2006), Liu (2011) and Gregoriou (2011) have examined whether information about 
the investment appeal of a stock is provided by news of listing changes. They all report 
significant improvement in stock’s performance after inclusion in the index. Therefore, 
considering the previous literature we expect listed SMEs to be more profitable and less 
susceptible to financial distress than their unlisted counterparts. Furthermore, if as a 
consequence of listing SMEs possess a richer information environment; trading may be more 
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frequent, resulting in increased liquidity. In order to empirically test this hypothesis we 
include proxies for liquidity as factors in explaining financial distress of listed SMEs. In 
particular, we use liquidity ratio of Amihud (2002) and illiquidity metric of Florackis et al. 
(2011) as suitable proxies. 
We empirically test our hypothesis using sample of listed and unlisted SMEs of the United 
States covering sampling period between 1980 and 2014. Firm level annual accounting 
information is sourced from Compustat and monthly stock prices from CRSP databases. 
Considering the suggestion of Gupta et al. (2015), we use discrete-time duration-dependent 
hazard model with logit link to perform univariate and multivariate one-year financial distress 
hazard analysis of listed and unlisted SMEs respectively. Financial ratios with established 
reputation of distress prediction in earlier studies are being used as covariates along with 
liquidity measure of Amihud (2002) and illiquidity measure of Florackis et al. (2011). Our 
definition of financial distress based  on  firms’  financial  performance  is adapted from Keasey 
et al. (2014). To gauge within-sample classification and out-of-sample validation 
performance of multivariate models developed, we estimate area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves of respective hazard models1.  
Based on our empirical findings, we report significant differences between distress hazard of 
listed and unlisted SMEs. In univariate analysis, an identical set of financial ratios are 
significant in discriminating between financially distressed and censored group of listed and 
unlisted SMEs, but we observe statistically significant difference in weights of regression 
coefficients of respective covariates (except tax/total assets) of listed and unlisted SMEs. 
Average Marginal Effects (AME) of respective covariates for unlisted group of firms are 
strikingly higher than their listed counterparts, suggesting higher vulnerability of unlisted 
firms due to changes in financial position. For listed SMEs, both liquidity factors also exhibit 
significant discriminatory power. Findings from our multivariate analysis also resonate with 
our univariate findings. STDEBV (short term debt/equity book value) and TCTA (trade 
creditors/total assets) are significant predictors of distress hazard of listed SMEs, but are 
excluded from the multivariate hazard model developed for unlisted SMEs. Suggesting listing 
can   improve   firms’ access to external finance. Further, estimated regression coefficients of 
mutual covariates in respective distress prediction models for listed and unlisted SMEs also 
show striking differences in their weights. This is validated by performing Wald test of 
                                                 
1 See Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) for relevant discussion on suitability of ROC curves in measuring classification 
performance of binary prediction models. 
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equality of regression coefficients of mutual covariate. Out of five mutual covariates, three 
exhibit significant statistical difference in the weight of the regression coefficients of listed 
and unlisted SMEs. This is further reinforced when we compare AME of respective 
covariates for hazard models of listed and unlisted groups. Similar to univariate analysis, 
AME of mutual covariates are significantly higher for unlisted SMEs than their listed 
counterparts. This supports our hypothesis that listed SMEs are less vulnerable to changes in 
financial position than unlisted SMEs. Additionally, the illiquidity measure based on Amihud 
(2002) enter significantly in the multivariate setup but the measure based on Florackis et al. 
(2011) is weakly significant. Finally, the within-sample and hold-out-sample area under ROC 
curves for all our multivariate distress hazard models are above 0.80, indicating very strong 
classification performance of our distress prediction models. Our results can be attributed to 
the ICLH given that the greater the liquidity of SMEs, the lower the probability of financial 
distress. This suggests that investors could demand a lower premium for holding stocks with 
relatively more available information. 
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: the next section defines our 
liquidity measures; section 3 outlines our empirical methods including an explanation of the 
dataset. Empirical results are reported in Section 4 and finally section 5 concludes our 
findings. 
2. LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
There are various measures of liquidity used in the academic literature. A vast majority of 
research papers use the bid-ask spread to capture liquidity effects around the announcement 
of news. In order to capture the financial stability of a firm, the Amihud (2002) ratio is used 
in previous market microstructure studies. We therefore compute the Amihud (2000) ratio by 
estimating Equation (1) in the following way. 
𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑉௜௧ =
1
𝑀௜௧
෍
|𝑅௜௧௠|
𝑉௜௧௠
ெ೔೟
௠ୀଵ
                                                                                                                      (1) 
where, 𝑅௜௧௠ and 𝑉௜௧௠ are, respectively, the return and the monetary volume of stock i on 
month m at year t, and 𝑀௜௧ is the number of valid observation months in year t for stock i.  
As argued by Florackis et al. (2011), the RtoV ratio cannot compare stocks with different 
market capitalization and therefore carries a significant size bias, i.e. small cap stocks are 
P A G E  | 4                                                                                                                              
 
bound to exhibit lower trading volume (in monetary terms) than big cap stocks leading to a 
size bias. Under the Amihud (2002) RtoV ratio (Equation 1), small cap stocks are 
automatically  characterized  as  ‘‘illiquid’’  due  to  their  size.  Therefore,  for robustness purposes 
we also calculate the Florackis et al. (2011) RtoTR ratio by computing the following 
equation:  
𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑅௜௧ =
1
𝑀௜௧
෍
|𝑅௜௧௠|
𝑇𝑅௜௧௠
ெ೔೟
௠ୀଵ
                                                                                                                      (2) 
where, 𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑅௜௧is the turnover ratio of stock i on month m, and 𝑀௜௧ and 𝑅௜௧௠ are defined as 
previously. The RtoTR ratio is free from size bias as there is no empirical association between 
turnover and market value (for more information see  Florackis et al. (2011)). It should be 
noted that both our liquidity measures are actually encapsulating illiquidity because the 
trading intensity variable is expressed in the denominator of each ratio. 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODS 
This section provides discussion related to the source and use of dataset, selection of 
explanatory variables and statistical models that we use for our analysis. 
3.1 DATASET 
We sourced   firm-level annual accounting information of the United States SMEs from 
Compustat and monthly stock prices of listed SMEs from CRSP databases. We consider a 
firm as SME if it reports annual sales turnover of less than $65 million. Considering the 
significant changes that were introduced in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, we ignore 
bankruptcy filings prior to 1980 and choose firms that filed for bankruptcy between January 
1980 and December 20142. However, in this study we concentrate on financial distress rather 
than legal bankruptcy with the presumption that it is the primary reason behind bankruptcy 
and always precedes the bankruptcy filing event. Further, filing for legal bankruptcy is the 
least efficient exit strategy for SMEs (Balcaen et al. 2012) and distress definitions based on 
bankruptcy laws are inefficient   in   comparison   to   distress   definition   based   firms’   financial  
performance (see Gupta et al. 2015). Thus, following Keasey et al. (2014), an SME 
experiencing financial distress is defined as one that satisfies the following: (i) its expenses 
exceeds earnings during two consecutive years, (ii) its total debt exceeds net worth during 
                                                 
2 However, after applying all required filters and excluding observations with missing values our sampling 
period narrows down between 1982 and 2014. 
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those two years in (i), and (iii) it records negative growth in net worth during the same 
consecutive periods in (i) and (ii). Additionally, a firm is also recorded as financially 
distressed in the year immediately following these distress events. 
We proxy a firm’s age as the earliest year, for which annual financial information is available 
for that firm in the Compustat database. 1950 is the earliest data entry year for firms’ 
financial information in Compustat, thus the maximum age that a firm could have is 64 years. 
Furthermore, firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 6,000 through 
6,999 (financial firms) and 4900 through 4949 (regulated utilities) are excluded from the 
sample. We  also  exclude  subsidiary   firms   (if   ‘stock  ownership  code’   (Compustat  data   item  
‘stko’)  is  ‘1’  (subsidiary  of  a  publicly  traded  company)  or  ‘2’  (subsidiary  of  a  company  that  is  
not publicly traded) in the Compustat database). We consider a SME as listed if it is publicly 
traded in any of the three popular exchanges, i.e. NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (Compustat 
data   item   ‘exchg’   is   11 (NYSE), 12 (AMEX) or 14 (NASDAQ)) and unlisted otherwise 
(Compustat   data   item   ‘exchg’   is   1 (non-traded company), 13 (OTC Bulletin Board) or 19 
(Other OTC)). Consequently, the final dataset consists of 40,078 firm-year observations with 
11,719 records for listed and 38,359 records for unlisted US-based SMEs3 (see Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.2 SELECTION OF COVARIATES 
To develop the hazard models we employ financial ratios that are already established as 
significant predictors of SMEs default risk. The adopted covariates assess firms’  performance  
on liquidity, solvency, activity, profitability and interest coverage dimensions. Specifically, 
we incorporate the covariates from popular studies on SMEs bankruptcy such as Altman and 
Sabato (2007), Lin et al. (2012), Gupta et al.( 2014) and others4. Two of the adopted 
covariates in this paper are novel to the SMEs default risk literature. These are measures of 
long-term illiquidity or liquidity. The first is the Amihud (2002) ratio, defined as the ratio of 
the absolute return to trading volume. However, trading volume is expected to be materially 
larger for high transaction instruments, thus leading to a large firm bias. As a result, we also 
compute the Florackis et al. (2011) illiquidity metric as a robustness test. This is because in 
                                                 
3 Note that given these exclusion criteria, firms could have multiple entry and exits in the dataset. For example, 
when an existing SME reports annual sales revenue over $65 million it exits our sample and returns only when 
its sales revenue drops below $65 million. 
4 Altman et al. (2010) and Gupta et al. (2014) provide detailed discussions of the covariates selected as well as 
their relationship with the probability of a default. 
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the Florackis et al. (2011), trading volume is replaced by turnover which is free from size 
bias.  All the covariates along with their respective definitions are listed in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
3.3 HAZARD MODEL 
3.3.1 BASIC HAZARD MODEL 
The survival analysis conducted in this study involves estimation of the time duration taken 
for an event to occur; in this case the event is a firm experiencing financial distress. Suppose 
T is a non-negative random variable denoting the time to a distress event and t corresponds to 
the survival of a firm beyond time t. Choosing not to express Ts probability density function 
as 𝑓(𝑡) or its cumulative distribution function (CDF) as 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr  (𝑇 ≤ 𝑡), rather  envisaging 
Ts survivor function, 𝑆(𝑡) or its hazard function ℎ(𝑡) significantly simplifies the survival 
analysis concept (Cleves et al. 2010). The survivor function estimates the probability of 
survival beyond time t, which is essentially the inverse CDF of T, i.e.: 
𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡)                                                                                                        (3) 
At 𝑡 = 0 the survivor function equals one and approaches zero as 𝑡 advances towards infinity. 
The relationship between the survivor function and the hazard function (also referred as the 
conditional failure rate at the time  𝑡) can be expressed mathematically defined as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆௧→଴
Pr  (𝑡 + ∆𝑡 > 𝑇 > 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡 =
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡) =
−𝑑  ln𝑆(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 ;                                                (4) 
Unambiguously, the hazard rate is defined as the (limiting) probability that the failure event 
occurs within a set time interval, given that the subject has survived to the onset of that time 
interval, divided by width of the time interval. The hazard rate takes on values from zero to 
infinity and may increase, decrease or remain constant over time. A hazard rate of zero 
indicates no risk of failure during the period in which it is computed, while infinity signifies 
certainty of failure.   
3.3.2 DISCRETE HAZARD MODEL 
An event occurring at any instant in continuous-time such that the exact censoring and 
survival times are recorded in relatively fine time scales like seconds, hours or days and there 
are no tied survival time periods, then one may employ continuous-time survival model in 
computing the likelihood of an event’s occurrence (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). 
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However, if the data has relatively few censoring or survival times with tied survival time 
periods, the discrete-time survival model is considered a more appropriate choice where 
coarse times-scales are commonly used, for example, expressing time to event in weeks, 
months or years (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Interval-censoring5 results in discrete-
time data, which is the case with our sample. Here, the start and end of each time interval is 
same for all the SMEs in the analysis time, given that the information provided is recorded on 
an annual basis. Therefore, the event of interest may take place at any time within the year; 
however, the detail is not available until the year concludes.  
Based on the foregoing, we therefore estimate our hazard models in discrete-time framework 
with random effects (𝛼௜), thus controlling for unobserved heterogeneity or shared frailty. The 
discrete-time representation of the continuous-time proportional hazard model with time-
varying covariates results in a generalized linear model with complementary log-log (Grilli 
2005; Jenkins 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) link, expressed in the following way: 
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔൫ℎ௜(𝑡)൯ ≡ ln{− ln(1 − ℎ௜(𝑡))} = 𝛽𝑥(𝑡)௜ᇱ + 𝜆௧                                                              (5)     
𝜆௧ denotes the time-specific constant estimated freely for each time period t, thus no 
assumption is made about the baseline hazard function within the specified time interval. 
However, in most empirical studies logit link is used over complementary log-log (clog-log) 
link as specified in Equation 6. 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒𝛼(𝑡)+  𝑥(𝑡)𝑖′𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡)+  𝑥(𝑡)𝑖′𝛽
                                                                                                      (6) 
Where α(t) captures the baseline hazard rate and  𝑃௜,௧ corresponds to the probability that 
subject i experiences the event at time t. This should yield strikingly similar results if the time 
intervals are small (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) and the sample bad rate (% of failed to 
non-failed) is very low (Jenkins 2005). One may also select a probit link function, assuming 
there are compelling reasons to that the underlying distribution of the process being modelled 
is normal, or if the event being studied is not a binary outcome but a proportion (e.g. 
proportion of population at different income levels). While these specifications will generally 
produce results that are quite similar, there are significant differences in terms of non-
proportionality (see Sueyoshi (1995) for detiled discussion). Therefore, considering this 
                                                 
5 The event in this case occurs in continuous-time; however, we only record the time interval within which the 
event takes place. 
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discussion and the suggestion by Gupta et al. (2015), we employ a discrete hazard model 
with logit link to develop our distress prediction models. 
3.3.3 SPECIFICATION OF BASELINE HAZARD RATE 
The next step is the specification of baseline hazard function, the hazard rate when all the 
covariates are set to zero. This stage in the analysis precedes the estimation of the discrete-
time hazard model itself. The specification of the baseline hazard function is achieved by 
defining time-varying covariates that exhibit functional relationships with survival times. 
Established specifications include log(survival time), polynomial in survival time, fully non-
parametric and piece-wise constant (Jenkins 2005). Fully non-parametric baseline hazard 
specification requires generation of age specific dummy variables. Assuming no missing time 
spells, the number of dummies should correspond to the maximum survival time in the 
dataset. For example, if the upper limit of survival time equals fifty years, fifty dummies are 
needed for model estimation6 (see for example, Beck et al. 1998). This approach is 
complicated by lengthy survival times as is the case with firm bankruptcy. A convenient 
alternative for specifying the baseline hazard function is to employ piece-wise constant 
method. This approach involves splitting the survival times into different time intervals that 
are assumed to exhibit a constant hazard rate (Jenkins 2005). However, duration specific 
hazard rate cannot be estimated for intervals/dummies with no events (see Jenkins 2005; 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Given its estimation convenience, the piece-wise constant 
specification of baseline hazard rate is desirable. Notwithstanding, it should be noted that the 
if the hazard curve shows recurrent and continuous sharp rises and falls, the fully non-
parametric baseline hazard shall be a more appropriate choice. 
3.4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In order to assess the performance of the models developed, we report area under the ROC 
curves, which is a widely used non-parametric method of   evaluating  model’s   classification  
performance (see Hosmer Jr et al. 2013). The ROC curve is obtained by plotting the true 
positive (when a firm actually defaults and the model classifies it default status as expected) 
against the false-positive (when a firm does not default but the model classifies its default 
status as expected) rate as the threshold to discriminate between non-failed and failed firms’ 
changes. The area under ROC curves (AUROC) encapsulates the precision of the model; with 
AUROC equalling 1 denoting a model with perfect prediction accuracy and equalling 0.5 
                                                 
6 The model is estimated using forty nine dummies in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity arising from the 
dummy variable trap. 
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suggest no discrimination  (see Anderson, 2007). Although  there  is  no  ‘golden  rule’  regarding  
the value of AUROC, however anything around 0.8 or above is considered to be excellent. 
The Gini coefficient and Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) statistics, usually employed as gauges 
of the performance of a scoring model, can be easily computed from AUROC. The Gini 
coefficient, defined as G  =  2(AUROC  −  0.5), captures the consistency in the prediction of the 
model as developed, while the K–S statistics quantifies the distance between the failed and 
non-failed distributions at the optimal cut-off point and is about 0.8 × Gini coefficient. A 
model with K–S statistics value below 20 should be re-examined, likewise a model having a 
value above 70 is probably too good to be true and should also be re-examined (see Anderson 
2007).  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We commence our discussion of the results by considering the descriptive statistics of the 
covariates along with the extent of correlation among them. This follows by univariate hazard 
analysis of each covariate in turn by using financial distress definition as discussed earlier in 
section 3.1. Then we discuss the development of multivariate discrete-time duration-
dependent hazard models based on Average Marginal Effects (AME) of respective covariates 
along with the baseline hazard specification. We also illustrate the steps involved in 
developing various multivariate hazard models along with relevant analysis relating within-
sample and out-of-sample classification performance of respective multivariate hazard 
models. To eliminate the influence of extreme outliers on our statistical estimates, the range 
of all financial ratios employed is restricted between 5th and 95th percentiles. Following the 
suggestion of Gupta, Gregoriou, et al. (2014), we also employ dummy indicators for micro 
(annual sales revenue is less than $ 2.6 million) and small (annual sales revenue is greater 
than $ 2.6 million but less than $ 13 million) firms into our hazard analysis to account for any 
differences   that  may  arise  due   to   firms’   size. Finally, all covariates are lagged by one-time 
period in order to ensure that the information is available at the beginning of each time 
period.  
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION 
Initial inspection of descriptive statistics is useful in evaluating the variability of the 
covariates and the potential biasness that may arise in the multivariate setup due to 
unexpected extreme fluctuations. We expect the mean of covariates that exhibit positive 
relationship with the insolvency hazard to be higher for the distressed group than for healthy 
P A G E  | 10                                                                                                                              
 
or censored group (e.g. see the variable TLTA in Table 3) of firms. On the contrary, the mean 
of covariates that shows negative relationship with the insolvency hazard is expected to be 
lower for the default group than for their healthy counterparts (e.g. see variable CETL in 
Table 3). Mean, median and standard deviation of all covariates are as per our expectation for 
respective group of listed and unlisted SMEs, except CTA (for listed SMEs) and STDEBV 
(for unlisted SMEs). These covariates might be problematic in the multivariate setup.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 4 provides evidence that some of the covariates are 
strongly correlated with each other. For example, FETA exhibits moderate to strong 
correlation with six other covariates. This is also the case with TCTA and LCR, while RETA 
shows strong positive correlation of approximately 0.74 with EBITDATA, supporting the 
expectation that SMEs primarily rely on internal sources for their funding requirements. In 
order to address this issue of multicollinearity effectively while developing multivariate 
models, we use a selection procedure of covariates based on their Average Marginal Effects 
obtained from the univariate analysis. Detailed discussion on this will follow soon. Moreover, 
casual observation of the means of respective covariates for listed and unlisted group of 
SMEs reveal striking differences expect TTA. Thus we get initial motivation to believe that 
the weights of the regression coefficients might be different for listed and unlisted firms.     
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.2 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF COVARIATES 
We estimate univariate discrete hazard models for respective covariates in turn using 
Equation 6 separately for listed and unlisted firms. In both cases the dependent variable has 
binary outcome, where  ‘1’ implies the firm has experienced the financial distress event and 
‘0’   otherwise   or   censored.   As evident from the estimated results reported in Table 5, all 
covariates are highly significant in discriminating distressed and censored firms for both 
groups with expected sign of respective coefficients, except STDEBV for unlisted SMEs. We 
expect  the  sign  of  it’s  coefficient  to  be  positive  but  it’s  negative,  which  might  be  due  to  the  
lower mean of STDEBV for distressed group than censored ones. Furthermore, we find 
evidence that both our liquidity measures are positive and significant for listed SMEs. This 
implies that the probability of default is related to a lack of liquidity of the stocks. This 
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provides evidence of the ICLH given that investors prefer not to hold securities with less 
information causing the probability of financial distress to increase.  
We also see in Table 5 that weights of regression coefficients of respective covariates for 
listed and unlisted groups are strikingly different. Casual comparison of their Average 
Marginal Effects7 (AME; dy/dx) reinforces our hypothesis, as we see large differences in 
AME of respective covariates between listed and unlisted groups. For respective covariates, 
the AME is significantly higher for unlisted SMEs that their listed counterparts.  This 
suggests that default probabilities of listed SMEs are less affected by unit change in value of 
respective covariate than unlisted SMEs. Overall, unlisted SMEs seem to be more vulnerable 
to financial distress due to changes in their financial ratios than listed SMEs. This supports 
our hypothesis that listed SMEs are less susceptible to financial distress than unlisted ones.   
In order to statistically test the differences in the weights of regression coefficients of 
respective covariates in different groups, we  use  ‘-gsem-’  command  in Stata 13. It performs 
the Wald test of equality of coefficients of mutual covariates obtained from two different 
regression models. The p-values of this test are reported in the last column of Table 5, which 
shows highly significant statistical difference in the weights of the regression coefficients of 
all respective covariates except TTA. This strongly suggests that although the default 
attributes for both listed and unlisted SMEs are mutual but they need to be treated separately 
while developing credit risk models. Further, in line with our hypothesis both liquidity 
measures RtoV and RtoT are highly significant in discriminating between distressed and 
censored listed SMEs.  
[Insert Table 5 Here]  
4.3 DEVELOPING MULTIVARIATE HAZARD MODELS 
We start this section with baseline hazard specification based on Kaplan-Meier estimates of 
hazard curves (see Cleves et al. 2010), followed by development of multivariate discrete-time 
duration-dependent hazard models with logit link for our sample of listed and unlisted SMEs. 
The dependent variable for both these models has binary outcome with financially distressed 
                                                 
7 In non-linear regression analysis, Marginal Effects is an useful way to examine the effect of changes in a given 
covariate on changes in the outcome variable, holding other covariates constant. These can be computed as 
marginal change (it is the partial derivative for continuous predictors) when a covariate changes by an infinitely 
small quantity and discrete change (for factor variables) when a covariate changes by a fixed quantity. Whereas, 
Average Marginal Effects (AME) of a given covariate is the average of its marginal effects computed for each 
observation at its observed values. Alternatively, AME can be interpreted as the change in the outcome 
(financial distress = 1; in our case) probabilities due to unit change in the given covariate, provided other 
covariates are held constant. See Long and Freese (2014) for detailed discussion on this topic.  
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equalling ‘1’  and  ‘0’  otherwise,  while  independent  variables are the set of covariates found 
significant in the univariate regression analysis. Considering the multicollinearity among the 
covariates, we introduce each covariate in turn into the multivariate setup based on the 
magnitude (sign is ignored) of their AME. For this, at first we rank8 all the covariates found 
significant in the univariate analysis based on the absolute value of their AME (see columns 
six and ten in Table 5) and then start introducing each covariate in turn into the multivariate 
setup in increasing order of the rank of their AME. The rational being, higher the value of 
AME, higher will be the change in the predicted probability due to unit change in the 
covariate. Thus a covariate with higher value of AME (e.g. FETA in Table 5) is more 
efficient in discriminating between distressed and censored firms than covariates with lower 
value of AME (e.g. TLTA in Table 5). Further, if the introduction of a covariate affects the 
sign9 of any previously added covariate, then that covariate is excluded from the multivariate 
model. This can possibly happen due to multicollinearity among covariates, thus their 
exclusion seems to be a reasonable choice. Moreover, we believe that this method of 
covariate introduction while developing the multivariate models leaves us with best set of 
covariates with expected sign of coefficients of respective covariates. Additionally, we also 
control for volatile macroeconomic environment and varying distress rates across different 
time periods by introducing year dummies in the multivariate hazard models.  
Final set of multivariate hazard models reported for both listed and unlisted SMEs are 
estimated using observation from entire sampling period available to us, thus we do not have 
separate test and holdout samples. In order to assess the within-sample classification 
performance of the models developed we estimate area under ROC curve for respective 
models using the full estimation sample (i.e. 1980 to 2014). For out-of-sample validation we 
first estimate multivariate hazard model using observation till the year 2011 and using these 
estimates we predict the default probabilities for the year 2012; then we include 2012 in the 
estimation sample and predict default probabilities for 2013 and so on, till the year 2014. 
Then we use the predicted default probabilities from the year 2012 through 2014 to estimate 
out-of-sample AUROC for respective multivariate hazard models.   
                                                 
8 Highest  value  gets  rank  ‘1’,  second  highest  gets  rank  ‘2’  and  so on. 
9 Coefficients with negative sign become positive and vice versa.  
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4.3.1 DETECTION OF BASELINE HAZARD RATE 
Figure 1 shows hazard curves for listed and unlisted SMEs estimated using Kaplan-Meier10 
estimator. As we see in Figure 1, the distress hazard of both listed and unlisted SMEs rises as 
firms get older, however for a given age this rise is almost double for unlisted SMEs than 
their listed counterparts. At the age of twenty the distress hazard of unlisted firms is almost 1, 
which implies certainty of failure. While for the same age the distress hazard is around 0.5 for 
listed SMEs. This implies that until the age of 20 years, unlisted SMEs are almost twice more 
vulnerable to financial distress than their listed counterparts. This difference in the hazard 
rates across the age category reinforce our hypothesis that listed and unlisted SMEs needs to 
be treated separately while modelling credit risk for them. Additionally, both hazard curves 
show  steep  rise  with  respect  to  firms’  age.  Under  this  situation  fully  non-parametric baseline 
hazard specification seems to an appropriate choice. Thus we include age specific dummies 
in our multivariate hazard models as specification for the baseline hazard rate.    
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.3.2 HAZARD MODEL FOR LISTED SMES 
The multivariate hazard model estimated for listed SMEs is reported in Table 6. Considering 
our covariate introduction method as discussed earlier; out of thirteen significant covariates in 
the univariate analysis, we find nine covariates suitable for developing the multivariate 
hazard model for listed SMEs. All financial ratios other than TCTA are highly significant in 
discriminating between financially distressed and censored firms with significant AME. The 
within-sample AUROC is about 0.87 and out-of-sample AUROC is about 0.82, which 
emphasises excellent discriminatory performance of our multivariate hazard model in 
identifying distressed and censored firms (see Figure 2). The AME are reported in 
percentage, which states that TTA is the most powerful covariate with AME of around -20 
followed by FETA with AME of around 10. The multivariate analysis is quantitatively 
similar to our univariate findings concerning the relationship between the probability of 
default and liquidity measures. RtoV and RtoT are significant respectively under 5% and 10% 
significance level.   This is because like the univariate analysis, we find that stocks with less 
information are regarded as illiquid, resulting in a greater likelihood of bankruptcy for SMEs.  
                                                 
10 See among others Cleves et al. (2010) and Mills (2011) for details on Kaplan-Meier hazard estimator. 
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4.3.3 HAZARD MODEL FOR UNLISTED SMES 
The multivariate hazard model for unlisted SMEs is also reported in Table 6. As we see, out 
of eleven highly significant covariates in univariate analysis, seven are appropriate in the 
multivariate setup. We also see some differences in the factors affecting the default 
probability of listed and unlisted SMEs. For instance, STDEBV and TCTA are significant 
predictors of insolvency hazard of listed SMEs, but they do not find a place in the hazard 
model developed for unlisted SMEs. This suggests that listing lead to better access to external 
finance, which might turn out to be a significant reason for their finance distress. Unlike 
listed SMEs, CETL and LCR enter significantly in the multivariate hazard model for unlisted 
SMEs, which emphasises the   importance  of  owners’  equity  on financial distress of unlisted 
SMEs. Further, Wald test of equality of regression coefficients of mutual covariate also show 
convincing results. Out of five mutual covariates, three exhibit significant statistical 
difference in the weight of the regression coefficients of listed and unlisted groups (see last 
column of Table 6). This is further reinforced when we compare AME of respective 
covariates for hazard models for listed and unlisted groups. As observed in the univariate 
analysis section, here also AME for all covariates are significantly higher for unlisted SMEs 
than their listed counterparts (see Table 6). This suggests that unlisted SMEs are more 
vulnerable to changing financial position unlike listed SMEs. Finally, the within-sample and 
hold-out-sample AUROC is about 0.85 (see Figure 2), which emphasises excellent 
classification performance of our multivariate hazard model developed for unlisted SMEs.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
5. CONCLUSION 
Access to external finance is unanimously the principal factor obstructing SMEs growth and 
development. This might be due to lack of collateral and information asymmetries. Prolonged 
difficulty in accessing external finance may lead to financial distress or bankruptcy. 
However,  stock exchange listing could relieve SMEs from external financing constraints 
(Kim 1999). Consequently reducing their overdependence on banks for external financing 
and thereby, reducing their likelihood of financial distress.  
We empirically test this hypothesis using sample of listed and unlisted SMEs of the United 
States covering sampling period between 1980 and 2014. One-year financial distress hazard 
analysis of listed and unlisted SMEs is performed using discrete-time duration-dependent 
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hazard rate modelling technique and set of financial covariates with established significance 
of financial distress prediction in earlier studies. The definition of financial distress employed 
based   on   firms’   financial   performance   is   adapted   from   Keasey et al. (2014). We report 
significant differences between distress hazard of listed and unlisted SMEs. Although 
identical set of financial ratios are significant in discriminating between financially distressed 
and censored group of listed and unlisted SMEs, but we report statistically significant 
difference in the weights of regression coefficients of respective covariates (except TTA) of 
listed and unlisted SMEs. AME of respective covariates for unlisted group of firms are 
strikingly higher than their listed counterparts, suggesting higher vulnerability of unlisted 
firms due to changes in financial ratios. Additionally, regression coefficients of mutual 
covariates in multivariate hazard models for listed and unlisted SMEs also show striking 
differences in their weights. Three out of five mutual covariates exhibit significant statistical 
difference in the weight of their regression coefficients. Our hypothesis is further reinforced 
when we compare AME of respective covariates for hazard models of listed and unlisted 
groups of firms. In line with univariate analysis, AME of mutual covariates are significantly 
higher for unlisted SMEs than listed ones.  
We also find that liquidity is a critical factor in explaining financial distress of listed SMEs, 
since we report positive association between default risk and lack of liquidity. Our results can 
be explained by the LCIH, where investors sell stocks with a poorer information environment 
contributing to an increased probability of bankruptcy of listed SMEs. Given the importance 
of SMEs and how the absence of liquidity contributed to the recent global financial crises, the 
results in our paper cannot be ignored.   
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Table and Figures 
Table 1: Sample Description 
Year Listed SMEs  Unlisted SMEs Distressed Censored Total % Distressed  Distressed Censored Total % Distressed 
1982 2 78 80 2.50  212 1,092 1,304 16.26 
1983 7 82 89 7.87  238 1,095 1,333 17.85 
1984 7 129 136 5.15  251 1,130 1,381 18.18 
1985 13 201 214 6.07  288 1,076 1,364 21.11 
1986 16 285 301 5.32  338 1,053 1,391 24.30 
1987 14 289 303 4.62  352 1,119 1,471 23.93 
1988 11 290 301 3.65  338 1,190 1,528 22.12 
1989 13 256 269 4.83  372 1,076 1,448 25.69   
1990 9 226 235 3.83  346 1,054 1,400 24.71 
1991 13 214 227 5.73  325 1,034 1,359 23.91 
1992 9 293 302 2.98  295 1,027 1,322 22.31 
1993 13 417 430 3.02  265   1,094 1,359 19.50 
1994 19 454 473 4.02  243 1,126 1,369 17.75 
1995 26 462 488 5.33  236 1,122 1,358 17.38 
1996 27 493 520 5.19  270 1,118 1,388 19.45 
1997 20 530 550 3.64  291 1,235 1,526 19.07 
1998 42 512 554 7.58  321   1,136 1,457 22.03 
1999 57 436 493 11.56  371 1,023 1,394 26.61 
2000 44 446 490 8.98  328 1,043 1,371 23.92 
2001 33 476 509 6.48  383 993 1,376 27.83 
2002 42 444 486 8.64  509 820 1,329 38.30 
2003 60 355 415 14.46  459 751 1,210 37.93 
2004 48 387 435 11.03  406 765 1,171 34.67 
2005 37 391 428 8.64  331 772 1,103 30.01 
2006 42 369 411 10.22  330 668 998   33.07 
2007 52 376 428 12.15  298 624 922 32.32 
2008 52 319 371 14.02  262 504 766 34.20 
2009 72   279 351 20.51  302 421 723 41.77 
2010 59 289 348 16.95  267 374 641 41.65 
2011 32 314 346   9.25  209 354 563 37.12 
2012 41 301 342 11.99  310 204 514 39.69 
2013 53 312 365 14.52  216 275 491 43.99 
2014 6 23 29 20.69  17 33 50 34.00 
Total 991 10,728 11,719   9,873 28,486 38,359  
Notes: This table presents year-wise distribution of samples of listed and unlisted SMEs used for this study. Columns two and 
six report the number of firms which has experienced the financial distress event, while columns three and seven report the 
number of censored observation for respective years. Column four and eight show total number of firms-year observations, 
while columns five and nine show the percentage of distressed firms in respective time periods. 
 
Table 2: List of Explanatory Variable 
Variable Definition Compustat Data Item 
EBITDATA Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization/total assets EBITDA/AT 
STDEBV Short term debt/equity book value DLC/SEQ 
CTA Cash and short-term investments/total assets CHE/AT 
RETA Retained earnings/total assets RE/AT 
CETL Capital employed/total liabilities (AT – LCT)/LT 
TLTA Total liabilities/total assets LT/AT 
CAG Capital growth; calculated as (Capitalt / Capitalt-1) - 1 (AT - LCT) 
TTA Taxes/total assets TXT/AT 
LCR ln(current assets/current liabilities) ln(ACT/LCT) 
TCTA Trade creditors/total assets AP/AT 
FETA Financial Expense/total assets XINT/AT 
RtoV Absolute Returns divided by Trading Volume ---- 
RtoTR Absolute Returns divided by Turnover ---- 
Notes: This table lists the set of covariates along with their respective definition that we use for our empirical analysis. 
The last column presents the specific Compustat database items that we use to estimate the covariates. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Status Indicator 
Listed SMEs  Unlisted SMEs 
Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
EBITDATA 0 -0.0590 0.0390 0.3204  -0.1610 0.0247 0.5544 
 1 -0.5071 -0.3325 0.5534  -0.7688 -0.3492 0.9020 
STDEBV 0 0.0715 0.0076 0.1979  0.1607 0.0348 0.4271 
 1 0.1489 0.0205 0.4203  0.0419 0.0000 0.6725 
CTA 0 0.3713 0.3186 0.2872  0.2270 0.1146 0.2564 
 1 0.4073 0.3815 0.2928  0.1692 0.0639 0.2327 
RETA 0 -1.1893 -0.2157 3.0453  -2.6794 -0.3953 6.3650 
 1 -4.5096 -2.5186 6.0285  -8.6159 -3.1280 10.7868 
CETL 0 4.4521 3.0671 3.7312  3.0706 1.6158 3.7060 
 1 1.3229 1.0330 1.4607  0.5574 0.3444 1.4324 
TLTA 0 0.3160 0.2655 0.2292  0.5870 0.4398 0.6467 
 1 0.7437 0.6388 0.4626  1.4944 0.9658 1.1523 
CAG 0 0.5102 0.1278 1.1174  0.3267 0.0434 1.1700 
 1 -0.2107 -0.2547 0.5934  -0.1358 -0.2908 1.0686 
TTA 0 0.0148 0.0003 0.0286  0.0102 0.0000 0.0251 
 1 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0128  -0.0007 0.0000 0.0117 
LCR 0 1.2961 1.3067 0.8158  0.6297 0.6598 1.1095 
 1 0.6979 0.6361 0.8894  -0.5000 -0.3397 1.1560 
TCTA 0 0.0624 0.0458 0.0597  0.1263 0.0831 0.1377 
 1 0.0959 0.0662 0.0999  0.2600 0.1754 0.2226 
FETA 0 0.0131 0.0048 0.0238  0.0354 0.0180 0.0542 
 1 0.0357 0.0216 0.0476  0.0923 0.0548 0.0940 
RtoV 0 0.1011 0.0331 0.2859  ---- ---- ---- 
 1 0.1452 0.0412 0.3214  ---- ---- ---- 
RtoT 0 2.5282 1.7036 3.4054  ---- ---- ---- 
 1 2.8924 1.8456 3.4212  ---- ---- ---- 
Notes: This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of explanatory variables for censored and financially 
distressed  listed  and  unlisted  SMEs  respectively.  In  column  two,  ‘0’  represents  censored  group  while  ‘1’  represents  distressed 
group of firms. 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
EBITDATA 1 1.00             
STDEBV 2 0.24 1.00            
CTA 3 -0.18 -0.16 1.00           
RETA 4 0.74 0.26 -0.13 1.00          
CETL 5 0.17 -0.09 0.46 0.21 1.00         
TLTA 6 -0.60 -0.26 -0.16 -0.69 -0.50 1.00        
CAG 7 0.10 -0.01 0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.09 1.00       
TTA 8 0.25 -0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.13 0.07 1.00      
LCR 9 0.39 0.02 0.50 0.45 0.68 -0.70 0.17 0.15 1.00     
TCTA 10 -0.54 -0.17 -0.18 -0.57 -0.44 0.70 -0.10 -0.10 -0.59 1.00    
FETA 11 -0.46 -0.18 -0.17 -0.52 -0.38 0.75 -0.08 -0.13 -0.56 0.49 1.00   
RtoV 12 -0.03 0.10 -0.14 -0.03 -0.10 0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.16 0.12 0.11 1.00  
RtoT 13 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.05 0.37 1.00 
Notes: This table presents correlation among the covariates analysed in this study. 
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Table 5: Univariate Discrete Hazard Analysis  
Variable  Sign 
Listed SMEs  Unlisted SMEs Wald Sig. Coefficient SE dy/dx  R  Coefficient   SE dy/dx R 
EBITDATA - -2.9019a 0.1271 -5.555a 5  -1.3645a 0.0258 -21.002a 5 0.0000 
STDEBV + 1.1563a 0.1434  2.459a 6  -0.3341a 0.0280 -5.443a 10 0.0000 
CTA - -0.8332a 0.2042 -1.531a 9  -1.9209a 0.0751 -30.121a 4 0.0000 
RETA - -0.1877a 0.0108 -0.400a 11  -0.0883a 0.0020 -1.454a 11 0.0000 
CETL - -1.0839a 0.0492 -0.300a 12  -0.8590a 0.0162 -7.533a 8 0.0000 
TLTA + 5.3174a 0.1984 7.750a 4  1.2141a 0.0203 19.503a 6 0.0000 
CAG - -1.7616a 0.0941 -1.951a 7  -0.4608a 0.0142 -7.322a 9 0.0000 
TTA - -34.3485a 2.6241 -72.691a 1  -32.6033a 0.9884 -500.719a 1 0.5237 
LCR - -1.3279a 0.0680 -1.566a 8  -1.0472a 0.0172 -14.829a 7 0.0000 
TCTA + 7.8282a 0.6179 14.837a 3  4.5560a 0.0933 72.241a 3 0.0000 
FETA + 18.8655a 1.2655 40.608a 2  10.3448a 0.2165 168.583a 2 0.0000 
RtoV + 0.6934a 0.1356 1.396c 10  --- --- ---  --- 
RtoT + 0.0245b 0.0113 0.05b 13  --- --- ---  --- 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports results obtained from univariate 
regression analysis of respective covariates for listed and unlisted SMEs respectively. Column two presents the expected sign of 
the coefficients, while columns three and six report the estimated coefficients of respective groups. In columns four and seven, 
‘SE’   represents   standard   error   of   the   respective   estimated   coefficients.   ‘dy/dx’   is   the   Average   Marginal   Effects (AME) in 
percentage, reported in  columns  five  and  nine  for  listed  and  unlisted  SMEs  respectively.  ‘R’  in  columns  six  and  ten  show  the  
rank of the covariates in decreasing order of the absolute value of their respective AME. The last column reports the p-values 
obtained from Wald test, that we use to compare the regression coefficients (to see if the coefficients are statistically different in 
both the groups) of listed and unlisted group of SMEs.  
 
Table 6: Multivariate Hazard Models 
Variable Expected Sign 
Listed SMEs   Unlisted SMEs Wald Sig. Coefficient SE dy/dx   Coefficient   SE dy/dx 
EBITDATA - -2.4171a 0.1732 -1.959a   -0.6768a 0.0320 -6.791a  0.0000a 
STDEBV + 0.9395a 0.1570 0.761a   --- --- --- --- 
CTA - -0.8512a 0.2653 -0.690a   -0.7654a 0.0963 -7.680a 0.7662 
RETA - --- --- ---   --- --- --- --- 
CETL - --- --- ---   -0.4936a 0.0179 -4.953a --- 
TLTA + --- --- ---   --- --- --- --- 
CAG - -1.0708a 0.0901 -0.868a   -0.3020a 0.0152 -3.031a 0.0000a 
TTA - -24.9889a 3.2041 -20.258a   -28.5456a 1.1268 -286.43a 0.1740 
LCR - --- --- ---   -0.1382a 0.0253 -1.387a --- 
TCTA + 0.7488 0.8139 0.603   --- --- --- --- 
FETA + 12.0645a 1.4418 9.780a   1.3030a 0.2699 13.075a 0.0000a 
RtoV + 0.3113b 0.1374 0.252b   --- --- --- --- 
RtoT + 0.0247c 0.0139 0.020c   --- --- --- --- 
Micro  -0.8707a 0.1962 -0.705a   0.7971a 0.0551 7.999a --- 
Small  0.0688 0.1330 0.055   0.4492a 0.0478 4.507a --- 
Age Dummies  --- --- ---   --- --- --- --- 
Year Dummies  --- --- ---   --- --- --- --- 
           
Goodness of Fit Value p-value    Value p-value   
Wald chi2 731.10 0.0000    4841.52 0.0000   
Log likelihood -2299.73     -15319.33    
AUROC          
Within Sample 0.8735     0.8563    
Holdout Sample 0.8172     0.8518    
Number of observations 11,719     38,359    
 Distressed 991     9,873    
 Censored 10,728     28,486    
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports results obtained from multivariate 
regression analysis of listed and unlisted group of SMEs.  Column  two  presents  the  expected  sign  of  the  coefficients.    ‘SE’  represents  
standard  error  of  the  respective  estimated  coefficients,  while  ‘dy/dx’  is  the  Average  Marginal  Effects  (AME)  in  percentage.  The last 
column reports the p-values obtained from Wald test of equality of coefficients of unlisted and listed groups. 
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Figure 1: Hazard Curves 
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Figure 2: Area under ROC Curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
